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Abstract
Android's intent framework facilitates binder based interprocess communication (IPC) and 
encourages application developers to utilize IPC in their applications with a frequency unseen in 
traditional desktop environments. The increased volume of IPC present in Android devices, 
coupled with intent's ability to implicitly find valid receivers for IPC, bring about new security 
challenges to the computing security landscape.
This work proposes Intentio Ex Machina1 (IEM), an access control solution for Android intent 
IPC security. IEM separates the logic for performing access control from where the intents are 
intercepted by placing an interface in the Android framework. This allows the access control 
logic to be placed inside a normal application and reached via the interface. The app, called a 
“user firewall”, can then receive intents as they enter the system and inspect them. Not only can 
the user firewall allow or block intents, but it can even—within designed limitations—modify 
them. Since the user firewall runs as a normal user application, developers are free to create their
own user firewall applications which users can then download and enable. In this way, IEM 
creates a new genre of security application for Android systems allowing for creative and 
interactive approaches to active IPC defense.
1Latin for intent of the machine. Ex Machina is an acronym meaning Extensible Mandatory Access Control Hook Integrating 
Normal Applications.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
One of the constraints which has shaped the design of Android is the limited hardware resources 
of the devices it is intended to run on. Due to limited memory, Android's creators wanted to 
design an architecture which encourages apps to leverage the functionalities and capabilities of 
the other apps already present on the device. By doing so, Android devices can conserve memory
by avoiding overlapping code between apps. This philosophy deviates from the traditional 
desktop environment where apps frequently try to minimize their dependency on other software 
by implementing all their own code.
To illustrate this difference, consider the task of taking a picture using a device's camera. In the 
traditional computing environment, the app would contain all the code necessary to access the 
camera, take the picture, and store said picture for future use. This is done to ensure that when a 
user installs the desktop app, it will run without the need for any additional software. On the 
contrary, in the Android environment, every Android device comes pre-installed with a default 
camera app. When a third-party app needs to take a picture using the camera, it can ask the 
already installed camera app, through interprocess communication (IPC), to take a picture on its 
behalf and return a reference for the picture to the requesting app so it can access the picture 
later.
It is also important to note that while this example Android app happened to utilize the 
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capabilities of the default camera app, it did not have to know the default camera app's name or 
process explicitly in order to do so. Instead, Android's system server, a privileged system app 
running in user space, receives from the third-party app a request describing the task it is trying 
to perform and the system server finds on behalf of the third-party app an appropriate receiver. 
More of this mechanism will be explained later, but for now it is sufficient to note the implicit 
nature of this IPC transaction and how it strongly contrasts the explicit IPC of traditional desktop
systems.
Due to this shift in app design philosophy, IPC occurs more frequently and among more apps in 
Android than in desktop systems like Windows or Linux. From the security perspective, this 
increased utilization of IPC and the frequently implicit nature of Android's IPC gives rise to 
interesting and unique security concerns.
First, since an app does not need to explicitly know a receiver in order to perform IPC, an app on
Android is able to invoke any other app which has components registered for handling requests. 
This is concerning for the receiving app because by registering components for request handling,
the app is opening itself to requests which could come from any other app on the device, 
including apps which may be malicious or come from untrusted sources. If the receiving app's 
exposed components happen to contain vulnerabilities, the attack surface for exploiting these 
vulnerabilities becomes system wide. Attacks related to this problem have already been observed
in the wild and are categorized as component hijacking[1].
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Second, since any app can register its components to handle any type of request, sender apps 
have cause for concern regarding where their data will end up. If a malicious app registers itself 
to handle a wide variety of requests, the sender app could find its data being exfiltrated into the 
hands of devious actors. This sort of attack has been categorized in other works as intent 
spoofing[2][3].
These problems have motivated both researchers and developers to seek solutions. My solution 
for intent IPC access control is an architecture which leverages the system-centric and 
standardized nature of intent IPC. IEM is motivated by the insight that while every firewall 
intercepts packets and takes actions based on some decision engine, these pieces don't have to 
reside near each other. Specifically, IEM replaces the intent firewall's engine with an interface 
which can bind to a normal app. This “user firewall” can then act as the system's intent firewall. 
The user is free to install a user firewall in any of the ways they would normally install an app on
their device. By placing the decision engine in an app, and not in a framework component like 
the intent firewall, developers can easily design the engine to utilize all the capabilities of any 
normal app including pushed updates which don't require rebooting or flashing, rich graphically 
enhanced user interaction, and access to system resources such as GPS and networking. In other 
words, rather than trying to be the be-all end-all solution to intent security in Android, IEM is a 
generic platform upon which developers can easily create, deploy, and maintain user firewalls. 
These user firewalls can then evolve with the changing threat landscape to meet the needs of 
their respective users.
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I have made a virtual machine image containing IEM and a proof-of-concept user firewall 
available for download2.
1.2 Related Work
This subsection discusses the IPC security mechanisms already present in the Android system as 
well as proposed designs from related research. These security architectures can be categorized 
into two general categories: access control and virtualization.
1.2.1 Access Control
In the access control category, we first find the sender permissions mechanism currently 
implemented in official versions of Android. This security feature allows receivers to require of 
the request sender a particular permission. This mechanism improves security by allowing for 
some restriction in which senders can invoke the receiver's exposed components, but it has its 
glaring limitations[4]. First, the receiver can only specify a single permission which the sender 
must have. Since it is common for Android apps to have multiple permissions, this means that 
the receiver's exposed components can be invoked by apps of lesser privilege. Second, even in 
the case of requester apps of equal or greater privilege, privilege and trustworthiness are not 
strongly correlated[5][6]. Applications coming from a variety of sources can request any 
combination of permissions and these permissions are granted upon approval by the user during 
installation. This makes it plausible for a malicious app to have as many, if not more, permissions
as the receiving app it is trying to exploit. These problems have been the motivation for works 
such as XmanDroid[7], Saint[8], CRePE[9], and others[10][11][12][13][14]. Even if the 
developer of the receiving app wants to explicitly check who the sender of the intent is, his app 
2http://jupiter.syr.edu/iem.amp.html
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can only see the last app to send the intent. ChainDroid[15] and Scippa[16] both demonstrate 
situations where this is inadequate for enforcing access control.
The other IPC access control mechanism present in Android is the intent firewall. Unfortunately, 
this firewall also has major shortcomings in the robustness of its rule set which is why very few 
production Android devices have intent firewall policies despite the firewall being present and 
enabled[17]. It can be configured via SEAndroid[18].
Other works, such as Boxify[19], use runtime sandboxing to force untrusted apps to send their 
system transactions through additional access control mechanisms. These solutions can also 
restrict Binder IPC, but implementing them requires expert knowledge of Linux IPC and 
syscalls. Since they work at the native level, the context of the transaction is obscured. IEM user 
firewalls use concepts the average app developer is already familiar with.
My work is conceptually similar to Android Security Modules[20], but differentiates itself in two
key aspects. First, while ASM only facilitates the monitoring of resources, my work enables 
modification for the purposes of redirection and data sanitization. Second, ASM uses callback 
timeouts; a limitation which violates the design goals of this work.
1.2.2 Virtualization
On the virtualization side of Android security, solutions attempt to achieve isolation between 
processes by virtualizing different portions of the Android device. One solution, Cells[21], 
achieves this isolation by creating virtual devices which run on top of the host device. Another 
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solution, Airbag[22], also achieves process isolation, but rather than creating full virtual devices, 
this solution creates virtual system servers which prevents processes from different containers 
from communicating. There are also other works which implement isolation, such as 
TrustDroid[23].
Virtualization is an attractive approach to solving Android app security because it not only 
controls the interactions between apps, but it goes a step further and isolates them. Not only is an
app not allowed to communicate with another app, it cannot communicate with another app. This
isolation, however, comes with side effects; both in implementation and in runtime 
reconfiguration.
First, virtualization requires the duplication of objects. Where there was originally one object, 
there are now multiple which increases resource consumption and creates overhead when 
switching between virtual objects.
Second, components can break if they are duplicated naively. Both Cells and Airbag ran into this 
problem when they duplicated the Android SurfaceFlinger. This Android component handles 
writing to the device's screen and functions under the assumption that it is the only object at its 
level trying to access the screen. Duplicate this component, and now multiple SurfaceFlinger are 
trying to write to the device's screen simultaneously. To patch this side effect, the Android system
must be modified to multiplex these competing signals. This increases the complexity of 
implementing and maintaining the code needed for virtualization which makes real-world 
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deployment less practical.
Lastly, virtualization solutions lack flexibility when security configurations require change. Since
virtualization creates a stronger isolation between apps than access control, reconfiguring 
virtualization becomes a more costly task involving migrating apps from one container to 
another. This is in contrast to access control which simply has to load and parse the new policy.
I chose an access control design for IEM because I want to leverage the unique nature of intent 
IPC. Specifically, IEM leverages the fact that all intents must travel through the Android system 
server using a standardized message format which the system can understand. A virtualization 
solution would not leverage the semantic understanding the system server has of intent messages.
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2 Background
2.1 Intent
Intents are a framework level abstraction of Linux Binder IPC. They serve as a simplified and 
standardized object for communicating with other apps and system services. Using intents also 
carries the added benefit that if a user apps does not explicitly know the name of a valid receiver 
for a particular IPC transaction, the user app can implicitly describe a receiver based on the task 
they're trying to perform and then the Android system server will find a suitable receiver.
The Android system server maintains a binder of handles for use in delivering intents to other 
apps. Whenever a system or user app is created, it is assigned a binder handle which allows it to 
communicate with the system server. Upon start up, every app uses its binder handle to the 
system server to register itself as an active app on the Android device. This registration process 
includes the registering app giving the system server a binder handle to itself which is then stored
for future use.
Upon receiving an intent, the system server has to resolve which component should receive that 
intent. If a target component is explicitly specified by the sending app, then the system server 
just checks the intent against the specified receiver's intent filter and confirms that they match. 
Otherwise, the system server will search its list of intent filters to find the eligible receivers for 
that intent. If the intent is intended for an activity, the system server will generate a list of all the 
valid receivers and then the user will be prompted to pick one. If the intent is for a service, the 
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system server will pick the first eligible receiver. If the intent is a broadcast, then all the 
subscribed receivers will be selected.
Once the receiver or receivers have been resolved, the intent is then passed to the intent firewall. 
The firewall compares the intent against its policies and decides if it should be dropped or 
allowed. If it is dropped, that's the end for that intent. If it is allowed, the system server then 
looks up the binder handle for the receiver, or starts the receiving app if it isn't currently running,
and delivers the intent to the receiver's message queue.
Finally, the receiver processes the intent and if a response is necessary the system server will 
forward it back to the original sender. These transactions occur asynchronously since they 
involve communicating across processes. Therefore, the original sender receives the results via a 
callback invoked by the system server.
2.2 Activity Manager Service
The system server in Android is a privileged process which runs in user space and which apps 
communicate with via binder transactions. The system server itself can be further divided into a 
collection of services, each of which is designed to manage particular tasks in the Android 
system. Since IEM is itself an object within one of the services, some background knowledge on 
them is necessary.
Activity manager service (AMS) is the main service for handling intents. Every user app is 
created with a binder handle for reaching AMS and most communication between apps starts 
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with the AMS. It has a collection of public methods for receiving intents and communicates with 
all the other system server services to make sure that the intent is resolved, permissions are 
checked, and the receiver is running and ready to receive the intent. Within the activity manager, 
there are four other components of interest to the IEM. The first is the intent firewall—explained 
in more detail later—which inspects every intent. Aside from that, there is the activity stack 
supervisor, the broadcast queue, and the active services components.
The activity stack supervisor manages the activity components of the user apps and is 
responsible for handling activity intents. This includes resolving the intent, checking if the 
intended receiver is already running, and checking with the intent firewall that the intent should 
be allowed.
The broadcast queue is the component within activity manager for handling broadcast intents. 
This includes resolving the intent, queuing up the intent for delivery to the decided receivers, and
managing the queue as broadcasts are canceled or updated. As with activity stack supervisor for 
activity intents, this is the component which will check with the intent firewall before allowing 
broadcast intents.
Finally, active services is the activity manager component for handling service intents. Like the 
other two components, this includes resolving the intent and checking with the intent firewall 
that it should be allowed, but uniquely this component handles scheduling the services to be 
started, stopped, and restarted as necessary.
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2.3 Intent Firewall
The intent firewall is an access control mechanism originally introduced in Android 4.3 and is 
present in all production Android devices; although almost none of them use it. The version of 
the intent firewall present in version 4.3 was more of a place holder than an actual firewall and it 
wasn't until version 4.4 that most of its currently existing features were implemented. As of 
Android 5.1 (Lollipop), almost no code has been modified from the 4.4 version. SEAndroid's 
configuration files support intent firewall policies[18], but few leverage this. The main purpose 
of the intent firewall is to buy time during a major malware outbreak by allowing device 
manufacturers to push policies which will explicitly block the malware's IPC[17]. Since such 
outbreaks are extremely rare, the intent firewall has almost never been used. Illustration 1 shows 
how the intent firewall fits into the framework.
Policies for the intent firewall are defined using one or more XML formatted files that are then 
written to a protected system directory on the Android device. Since this directory is a system 
directory, it is only accessible to privileged apps which prevents arbitrary apps from 
Illustration 1: Android Intent Firewall.
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reconfiguring the firewall. This directory is checked at boot time by the intent firewall and then 
continuously monitored for changes. If a change is detected, the intent firewall will automatically
try to parse any new or modified files with the XML extension for firewall rules. If a file is 
deleted from this directory, the intent firewall will automatically delete the rules associated with 
that file.
The activity manager checks intents against the intent firewall near the end of the flow. 
Consequently, even though intents can be implicit or explicit when the sending app creates them,
all intents are explicit by the time they enter the intent firewall. Also, all three types of intents 
(activity, service, and broadcast) are checked by the intent firewall before reaching the receiver. 
In the case of pending intents, a special mechanism where an app can store an intent in the 
activity manager and trigger it later, the pending intent is already an explicit intent by the time it 
enters the firewall. Although the intent firewall checks all intents going from the sender to the 
receiver, any responses returned to the sender are not checked. In other words, allowing an intent
to be delivered to its intended receiver implicitly allows any response to be returned to the 
sender. IEM also makes this implication.
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3 Design
This section formulates the main architectural goal of IEM and assesses the challenges in trying 
to achieve it. Illustration 2 contains a high-level overview of the design which will be explained 
in the following subsections.
3.1 Architectural Goal
All firewalls contain three critical pieces: the interceptor, the decision engine, and the policy. The
interceptor captures the data packet and delivers it to the decision engine which then decides if 
the packet should be allowed or denied based on the configuration defined in the policy. From 
this model, we can make some insightful observations. First, there is little flexibility in where an 
interceptor can be placed since it has to be somewhere along the original path of the packet. On 
the other hand, the decision engine can be placed anywhere so long as the interceptor can reach 
it. Second, while the policy is easy to reconfigure, it is restricted by the logic of the decision 
engine. A particular policy can only refer to attributes which the engine defines.
Illustration 2: Intentio Ex Machina.
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With these two observations in mind, reconsider the intent firewall in Illustration 1. In this case, 
the interceptor and the decision engine both reside in the framework. The interceptor must be 
placed in the framework because it's the only point through which all intents must pass, but what 
about the decision engine? Since it resides in the framework, modification requires an OS patch 
which is quite inconvenient. Sure implementation is easiest when the engine is in the same spot 
as the interceptor, but what would happen if it were moved somewhere else? Specifically, what 
would happen if the engine was placed inside a normal app? It could then be installed, updated, 
and maintained with the ease of any other app. Now the policy is less restricted by the engine 
because said engine can easily be swapped out for new logic.
With this idea in mind, the goal of IEM is to provide a hook in the intent flow to allow for an app
to serve as the intent firewall. As previously mentioned, doing this makes changing the firewall's 
enforcement logic easier which in turn allows for more flexibility. Making the firewall an app 
empowers the user to install the solution which fits their needs. One user might download a user 
firewall which monitors his location and restricts the apps he can use while in the office. Another
user might use a user firewall which prevents apps from getting her location while she's driving. 
A parent might put a user firewall on her child's device to prevent him from playing video games
before dinner, or maybe he can text message his friends only after he finishes his math 
homework. These are all apps an Android developer can program, so these are all apps which 
IEM can empower.
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Illustration 2 shows IEM and how it interfaces with the rest of the framework and other apps. 
From here on, “IEM” specifically refers to the hook which resides in the framework while “user 
firewall” refers to any app which leverages IEM. Edge 3 is the most novel part of the design 
because this edge does not exist in the original intent firewall. Intents first enter the system 
server through the public API at edge 1. This is where activity manager resolves the receiver. 
Following some basic security checks, the intent enters the IEM via edge 2. Illustration 3 
highlights IEM's internal logic. The intent is delivered to the user firewall and a response is 
returned via edge 3. If the user firewall decides to allow the intent, the response will come back 
to IEM which will then pass the intent to the activity manager via edge 2. Finally, the intent is 
delivered via edge 4.
The next subsection identifies and addresses the key challenges in trying to achieve the IEM 
architecture.
Illustration 3: The flow of intents 
through IEM.
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3.2 Design Challenges
Illustration 3 shows that there are three new pieces which IEM introduces into the Android 
system. This subsection considers each piece in turn and addresses the challenges which arise 
due to their addition.
3.2.1 Intent Interceptor
The first new piece an intent reaches is IEM's interceptor. Which intents are appropriate to 
intercept? I began by intercepting all the intents and then quickly realized why this is a poor 
decision and consequently why this is not a trivial problem.
The problem is not trivial because we cannot assume that the user firewall will always be 
responsive since it's an app. Like any other app, it can crash or freeze. This is different from the 
original intent firewall which could simply intercept all intents because it didn't have to worry 
about the state of any other component.
Since the system server uses intents to start components, if the interceptor intercepts everything 
and the user firewall crashes, the system will no longer be able to start any component. The 
device is now stuck in an unrecoverable state. For this reason, intents created by the system are 
exempt from being intercepted.
Once system intents have been exempt, all that remains are app created intents. These can be 
safely forwarded because failing to deliver them will only impact the app and not the system.
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3.2.2 User Firewall Interface
After the interceptor, the intent next reaches the user firewall interface. In order for the user 
firewall to be able to inspect intents, this interface has to be able to send the appropriate intents 
to an app and get a response on how the intent should be handled.
How can the interface forward an intent to an app and get a response? The answer to this 
challenge can be derived from a feature which already exists in Android: the extensible 
framework. This design pattern works by having a system service bind to an app service which is
chosen by the user in the device settings. Once bound, the system and app can exchange 
messages to communicate. This allows the user to install third party apps to serve as the 
keyboard, the settings administrator, the “daydream” screen when the device is docked, and 
more.
IEM mimics this architecture. When the user enables a user firewall, IEM will bind to that app's 
user firewall service. Once a binding has been established, the intercepted intents will be sent to 
the user firewall via that binding. The messages sent through the binding include a “reply to” 
handle which the user firewall can then use to return a response to the interface. If the user 
firewall decides to allow the intent, it sends a reply message via the binder handle. Otherwise, it 
can just discard the message.
There is another challenge regarding the design of the user firewall interface. In the original 
intent firewall, intents are processed entirely inside the framework. For IEM, there is now an 
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interface performing IPC with a user app. This change carries consequences which must be 
addressed.
As mentioned earlier, the user firewall app could crash or freeze. If this happens, the user 
firewall interface will no longer get responses from the app. With this in mind, should the 
interface be allowed to maintain any notion of state when communicating with the user firewall? 
If state is allowed, this has to be done by either having the interface's worker threads block while 
performing IPC with the user firewall or by storing information in a database inside the system 
server. Both these options carry grave consequences because they can lead to resource 
exhaustion. Even if a timeout mechanism is implemented for preventing the buildup of blocked 
threads or data entries, the design will still be weakened because now an artificial time limit has 
been imposed on the user firewall for making access control decisions. If this timeout is short, 
then it no longer becomes possible for the user firewall to involve the user in the decision 
making process. This reduces the flexibility of the firewall logic which weakens the goal the 
architecture strives to achieve. If the timeout is long, the device will become unresponsive. There
is no middle ground; either choice is detrimental to the goal of designing a platform which 
allows for the easy creation of many different firewall decision engines. For this reason, there 
shouldn't be any timeouts. The interface must be completely stateless.
Since IEM has to maintain statelessness and never be waiting on the user firewall app, the 
message sent to the user firewall has to contain all the necessary information so that the intent's 
state can later be reconstructed. To address this challenge, I introduce the concept of the intent 
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wrapper. Illustration 4 summarizes its structure. The intent wrapper is a bundle containing the 
original intent along with everything necessary to duplicate the sending of the intent. This 
includes sender information; something which the original intent firewall doesn't consider. By 
wrapping these additional variables together along with the intent, the user firewall receives a 
complete picture of who the sender is, who the receiver is, and what interaction they're 
performing.
3.2.3 User Firewall
The intent now reaches the user firewall. Since this app has the intent wrapper containing its 
state, what should the firewall be allowed to modify? It could, for example, perform data 
sanitization or redirect the intent to a different receiver. However, allowing the user firewall to 
modify all the fields of the wrapper would be dangerous because this gives it the power to send 
any intent to any app on behalf of any other app. There is value in allowing for modification, but 
having no restrictions grants too much power. This problem is addressed by the intent token.
Illustration 4: Intent 
wrapper.
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Inspiration for the intent token comes from the SYN cookie design which prevents SYN flooding
by making the TCP handshake stateless.[24] Similarly, the intent token allows IEM to remain 
stateless while still restricting the user firewall app's power. Tokens are generated inside IEM by 
hashing a secret which it creates at startup. Randomized salts are used to ensure tokens are 
unique. As long as the secret is kept confidential, the user firewall will be unable to create valid 
tokens and consequently cannot send arbitrary intents on behalf of other apps. In this way, the 
user firewall is a privileged app, but only to the extent essential to it performing its role as an 
intent firewall.
More challenging, however, is deciding which other parts of the wrapper should be included in 
the hash to prevent modification. This answer can be determined by grouping the contents of the 
intent wrapper into the three mutually exclusive categories shown in Illustration 4: sender, intent,
and receiver. The variables pertaining to the sender's identity stand out from those of the intent 
and receiver because the sender is the creator of the intent. If the user firewall changes who 
created the intent, all integrity is lost. The user firewall could create an intent and change the 
sender to be another app. On the other hand, changing the receiver seems reasonable because 
receiver resolution is the reason apps give intents to the Android system in the first place. For 
these reasons, the user firewall is allowed to modify the action to be performed and who will 
carry it out, but it cannot change who sent it. The complete intent token is shown in Illustration 5.
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3.3 Threat Model
Illustration 3 shows that the boundaries between the IEM, framework, and app spaces are crossed
in four places. This subsection addresses the security of these crossings in the order that intents 
reach them.
The threat model for IEM assumes that the framework is secure and trustworthy. This includes 
the activity manager since it is apart of the framework. This assumption is made because IEM is 
designed solely to enforce intent security, so any compromise of other framework components is 
out-of-scope. The model also assumes that the secret created by IEM for generating tokens is 
kept secret. This is a safe assumption because IEM never needs to share this secret with any 
other party.
The first boundary crossing is from the sender in app space to the activity manager in the 
framework. This boundary is protected by activity manager's public API which is outside the 
control of IEM. Therefore, IEM assumes that this boundary is secure.
Illustration 5: Intent token.
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The next boundary is between IEM and the activity manager. Since the threat model already 
assumes that activity manager is trustworthy, the boundary is between two trusted parties. This 
makes the boundary secure.
After entering IEM, the intent next reaches the boundary between the user firewall interface in 
the IEM space and the user firewall in app space. This surface can be attacked by a malicious app
so protection mechanisms are necessary.
Three actions occur over this boundary. First, the interface binds to the app. Second, the interface
sends the app intents to inspect. Third, the interface receives intents from the app. Attacking the 
first action requires the attacker to bind to either the interface or the user firewall. The interface 
protects against this by disallowing apps from initiating the binding process. Instead, it is always 
the interface which initiates the binding and since it gets its target from the device settings, it will
bind with the correct service. Since the interface is apart of the system, the user firewall can 
differentiate the attacker from the interface by checking the UID of the bind request. Attacking 
the second and third actions can be performed by either the user firewall or another app. If the 
attacker is another app, it will have to sniff and spoof binder messages. Since the Binder is part 
of the Linux kernel, this is out-of-scope for IEM. In the case where the attacker is the user 
firewall, spoofing cannot occur since the contents of the message are protected by the intent 
token. This covers all the actions which occur over this boundary.
The last boundary crossing is from the user firewall interface to the activity manager. This path is
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used to deliver the allowed intents to their receivers. An attacker targeting this boundary has to 
spoof a user firewall response, but as stated earlier, this is prevented by the intent token. 
Therefore, this boundary is secure.
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4 Implementation
Intent Firewall & IEM
All intent, caller uid, caller pid, resolved type
Activity resolved receiver
Service resolved service, resolved application
Broadcast receiver uid
IEM only
Activity caller thread, caller package name, caller userid, request code, caller 
binder, start flags, options bundle
Service caller thread, caller binder, caller callbacks, caller package name, 
flags, caller userid
Broadcast caller thread, intent receiver, result code, result data, required 
permission, appop flags, is sticky, is serialized, receiver userid
Table 1: Breakdown of parameters by intent type.
This section covers the details and challenges faced in implementing IEM in Android AOSP. The
problems are presented in order of the edges they pertain to in Illustration 2. The particular 
versions of Android which IEM is implemented in are 5.0.2 and 5.1.1.
4.1.1 Sender API Return Values
Starting with edge 1 of Illustration 2, we must consider the return values of the methods used by 
apps to send intents to the activity manager. Although the actual process of delivering the intent 
to the intended receiver is carried out asynchronously, a return value is synchronously returned to
the sender. For example, when an app requests to have a service started, activity manager will 
return the name of the resolved service to the sender.
This synchronously returned value poses a design challenge for IEM because once it forwards 
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the intent to the user firewall, activity manager drops the intent. This is necessary in order to 
remain stateless. Since the intent was dropped, the value returned to the sending app will indicate
a failure; regardless of the user firewall's response. In practice, this is not a problem for activity 
or broadcast intents because developers do not invoke the API directly but rather use the Context 
class. An exception is raised if the value returned indicates a failure, but is then immediately 
discarded in an empty catch block. Nothing is returned to the app code which invoked Context; 
neither in the successful case, nor in the unsuccessful case.
Services, however, are often invoked in order to perform tasks which are of critical importance to
the app. For this reason, Context does make sure the value returned by the activity manager 
reaches the calling app code and some apps are designed to stop if the response doesn't match 
expectations. Google's music app, for example, will raise an exception and crash if it believes it 
failed to start its service which manages the downloading of music streams. For this reason, 
simply removing the return value is not an option.
Since waiting for the user firewall's response is also not an option given the design goals, IEM 
has to return the original value even though the user firewall might decide to block the service 
intent. I have evaluated this side effect considerably and deemed it to be acceptable. In the case 
that the user firewall decides to allow the service intent, nothing changes from the sender's 
perspective since the task is carried out asynchronously. If the user firewall does block the 
service intent, then the sender will never get a response from the service it tried to start or bind. 
Since this communication is inherently asynchronous, Android apps already account for the case 
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where a response isn't received. Google's music app, for example, continues working without 
issue aside from the fact that it won't be able to stream music. Since the app doesn't crash or 
freeze, this outcome is acceptable.
4.1.2 Intent Firewall API
This brings us to edge 2. In the original intent firewall, interactions with the activity manager are 
performed via one of three exposed methods. They're separated based on the type of intent they 
process; activity, service, or broadcast. This separation is necessary since the different intents 
require different internal data structures. IEM also uses three public methods for this reason. 
However, the arguments have been modified. Since it was decided that IEM should be stateless, 
additional parameters which are not necessary in the original intent firewall design are now 
required. It is now necessary for the activity manager to give IEM these internal data structures 
regarding the state of the intent transaction. These new values were systematically selected based
on the parameters needed by activity manager's intent sending API. Table 1 compares the original
parameters with the new ones. Remember that the values pertaining to the sender's identity are 
tokened to prevent modification by the user firewall.
With activity and broadcast intents, all the public API in the activity manager ultimately call a 
single API. The different entry points are merely for convenience. This makes it easy for IEM to 
later invoke the correct API when it needs to restore an intent's state. This is not the case for 
service intents. They use four different API which each perform a unique action: start, stop, bind,
or peek. If IEM doesn't invoke the correct API, the wrong action will be performed.
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In the original firewall, all four service API first resolve the intent and then call the same method 
to retrieve the appropriate record for the receiver. It is this method which invokes the intent 
firewall, therefore the action being performed is not known to the firewall. The problem is 
illustrated in Illustration 6. This is fine for the original design, but not for IEM.
To restore this lost information, the receiver lookup method has to be modified to keep track of 
which action is being performed. This is a side effect of making IEM stateless. The change, 
however, is minimal. The total impact to the Android AOSP code is presented in the evaluation 
section.
4.1.3 Intent Unparceling
This brings us to edge 3. A significant implementation choice which has to be made here is 
where to store the intent token. Since the goal is to minimize how much of Android AOSP is 
impacted by the IEM implementation, I initially decided to store the token in the extras field of 
the intent. This ended up causing system crashes and after further study, I discovered why. The 
problem has to do with how the intent extras field is structured.
Illustration 6: Service API flow.
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The extras field is a bundle containing any additional information which the receiver of an intent 
needs. Since intents have to be able to move through the binder, the extras bundle is comprised 
of only basic data types and parcelable Java objects which can be flattened into basic data types 
and then later reinitialized. Basic data types are always the same size, but some parcelable 
objects, like the Java string, are not. This means that if a process wants to read the contents of the
extras, it has to somehow determine the boundary between objects in the extras bundle. This is 
done by placing an integer before each item in the extras which identifies the data type of the 
object.
The problem, however, is what happens if the parsing process reaches an item with an unknown 
identifying value? Since it does not know what the data type is, it cannot know how big the item 
is and therefore cannot parse the extras bundle beyond that point. When an app component uses a
custom parcelable Java class, the developer gives this class to all the other components which 
may need to communicate with that component. This is fine for app developers, but not for IEM. 
For this reason, the token cannot be stored in the extras field of the intent.
Modifying intent is now unavoidable, so the question becomes how should it be modified? The 
two options are to either modify the way bundles are structured and parsed or to create a new 
standalone field for the intent token.
Modifying the bundle would be wonderful since it would patch a known vulnerability[25] and 
enable user firewalls to always be able to check the extras field. Unfortunately, bundles are used 
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extensively throughout the Android architecture. The system impact would be difficult to 
measure let alone evaluate.
Instead, IEM modifies intent to have an additional field which can hold the token. This does not 
cause any problems for currently existing apps since they never need to read or write to this field.
Due to the virtual nature of the Android runtime environment, developers don't even need to 
change SDKs to write apps for an Android device using IEM. The modification made to intent 
for IEM has no impact on current or future Android apps. It is fully compatible with the current 
Android ecosystem.
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5 Applications
The generic nature of IEM allows developers to create many different kinds of user firewalls 
which can serve a variety of purposes. All the user firewalls which are presented in this section 
could be implemented in the original intent firewall, but doing so would be vastly impractical. 
Developers would need to have Android framework specific knowledge to access resources 
without using an SDK and each firewall would have to be tested extensively since 
implementation modifies the operating system. Some of the examples are designed to address 
very specific needs, so it would be very challenging to anticipate and generalize these firewalls 
to a degree which justifies implementing them into the official Android OS source code.
The developer of a user firewall only needs to implement a service component. Drawing 1 is a 
template for the handler. The data bundle contains all the objects listed in Table 1. This 
architecture gives the user firewall developer the flexibility to design the internal logic of his app
however he desires to provide whatever services and features his end-users require.
Drawing 1: UFW service handler template.
@Override
public void handleMessage(Message msg) {
  Bundle data = msg.getData();
  Bundle res = checkIntent(data);
  if (res != null) { //allow
    Message r = Message.obtain(null, 1);
    r.setData(res);
    try {
      msg.replyTo.send(r);
    } catch (RemoteException e) {}
  }
  //blocked intents require no action
}
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In this section, I describe a few examples of user firewalls which are made possible by IEM. I 
have chosen just a small sample from the infinite number of possible user firewalls which I 
believe to be sufficient to demonstrate the flexibility of the IEM architecture.
5.1 Simple Firewall
For the first example, I will start with a more simplistic user firewall which implements the 
functionality of a traditional firewall. Illustration 7, is an image of this simple user firewall. 
Users can select a policy and then the user firewall will enforce it.
In the case of Illustration 7, the user has selected the block browser policy. While this policy is 
being enforced, the user will be unable to open the browser. This means that tapping the 
browser's icon in the device's launcher will not start the app and tapping a URL in another app 
will not cause the browser's activity to start. The user firewall also contains some other example 
policies. For example, one policy will block the Google Play Service (GPS). While this service is
blocked, apps will not be able to utilize Google Play for updating, performing in-app purchases, 
Illustration 7: Blocking intents.
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or any other functionality this service provides. Another policy will block Gmail's services. With 
this policy enabled, users can open Gmail and read their current email, but they will not be able 
to fetch or send new emails. This user firewall can even enforce policies which stop the user 
from accessing the devices settings or recent app menus, a capability which will be greatly 
leveraged in another example firewall. This example app also displays real-time statistics for the 
user like which policy is currently loaded and how many intents that policy has allowed or 
blocked.
Since this example is designed to adhere to the functionality of a traditional firewall, it does not 
leverage the intent rewriting functionality of the IEM. That will be utilized in the next example.
5.2 Redirecting Intents
Unlike traditional firewalls, user firewalls are not restricted to binary allow or deny access 
control. It is also possible for user firewalls to allow an intent, but modify some of its contents. 
This allows for some interesting use cases such as intent redirection.
Illustration 8: Redirecting intents.
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Consider a corporation which is concerned about employees taking pictures using their phone 
while in the office. Banking institutions are an example since there may be sensitive information 
in documents and on computer monitors which could be captured when the photo is taken. Lets 
suppose that the corporation has created a camera app for their employees which is designed to 
only take “safe” photos. However, since this app is very restrictive, employees don't want to have
to use the corporate camera app when they aren't at work. A user firewall can control which 
camera app is launched based on GPS location using intent redirection.
Illustration 8 demonstrates this case. When the user wants to launch the normal camera app, the 
user firewall will check the user's current location. If they aren't in the office, the intent will be 
allowed. If they are in the office, the intent will be redirect to the corporate camera app and it 
will show up instead.
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5.3 Preventing Intent Denial of Service
When I implemented the intent token, I intentionally created a new field for it because 
attempting to read or write to any part of the extras bundle of an intent will raise an unmarshaling
exception if any object in the extras is a custom class and the receiver does not have a definition 
for it. I discovered that most apps do not handle the unmarshaling exception and will crash. The 
Gmail app is one such example. This is a known vulnerability which Google has classified as 
being low severity[25].
To demonstrate the potential damage of this vulnerability, I created a malicious app called 
Marshal Bandit. Upon boot, Marshal Bandit queries the activity manager for all the running 
services and spams them with intents containing a custom object in the extras bundle. This 
causes services on the device to repeatedly crash and overwhelms activity manager's worker 
threads. The result is a denial of service which causes the device to become unresponsive and 
eventually crash. Since the user cannot access the Settings app while the attack is underway, the 
Illustration 9: Intent DoS detection.
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device is crippled. Even if the user is advance enough to know how to boot the device into safe 
mode, she won't know which app to uninstall. Marshal Bandit is a normal app with no granted 
permissions.
This type of attack cannot be stopped in current Android devices, but it can be stopped by a user 
firewall thanks to IEM. In Illustration 9, I demonstrate a user firewall which can detect the 
sudden flood of intents coming from the malicious app. Upon detection, the user firewall will 
inform the user which app is performing the attack while stopping the attacker's background 
processes, halting the spam of intents. The user can then regain control of the device and 
uninstall the malicious app. This user firewall is a normal app using only permissions which any 
app can request and IEM. The successful thwarting of this recently discovered denial of service 
attack demonstrates the flexibility and capability of IEM. Implementing logic of this complexity 
at the framework level would be too challenging compared to the narrow scope of attacks it 
addresses. With IEM, a user firewall app which addresses this vulnerability can be developed by 
a single developer in one work day.
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5.4 Sanitizing Intent Data
Since user firewalls can modify the contents of the intent itself, a user firewall can perform data 
sanitization. This is applicable to trends such as “Bring Your Own Device” for the corporate 
environment.
If an Android app wants to share data with another app, most ways of doing so require an intent. 
The intent will either contain the data itself, a URI pointing to a file containing the data, or the 
intent will be for a service binding which will then be used to share data back and forth. In all 
three cases, a user firewall can either block or alter the data by dropping or modifying the initial 
intent. Illustration 10 demonstrates this functionality. In this example, when the user tries to open
a malicious image file, the user firewall modifies the intent so a benign image is opened instead. 
This same technique can just as easily be applied to other types of data to either prevent data 
leakage or to protect apps from exploitation. This functionality is similar to the web application 
firewall (WAF) concept[26].
Illustration 10: Data sanitization.
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This is by no means a complete solution to controlling data flow—intents aren't involved in 
networking transactions—but IEM can allow user firewalls to solve some BYOD problems while
being easy to develop, deploy, and maintain.
5.5 Isolating Applications
User firewalls leveraging IEM can also isolate applications from each other by inspecting the 
sender and receiver of every intent. This allows the user firewall app to create “secure 
containers”. Once the user places an app in a secure container, the user firewall can enforce a 
policy on the boundary between the container and the rest of the device. Maybe apps can't send 
intents to apps in the container. Maybe container apps can't send intents out. Maybe the 
contained apps can't bind to the location provider to get GPS position. There are many possible 
applications for this design such as parental control.
Current parental control apps struggle to keep the child confined to the safe environment because
it is difficult to prevent the child from accessing the device's settings and recent apps list. Both of
these actions involve sending an intent. Therefore, if the parental control apps were to become 
user firewalls, they could simply drop these intents and thereby prevent the child from escaping 
the parental control app's environment. It would also become possible for the app to enforce its 
parental control on the default launcher, as compared to current solutions which entail creating a 
new launcher on top of the default launcher.
Application isolation can be achieved knowing only the sender and receiver of the intent. 
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However, there are more complicated problems which user firewalls can tackle which require 
knowing the sender's sender. This is the problem of caller chains which is the focus of the next 
example application.
5.6 Determining Caller Chains
One potential shortcoming with the Android permissions architecture is that it only considers the 
immediate sender of an intent. It does not account for the case where a chain of apps are invoked 
via intents. If an attacker invokes an app with slightly greater permissions and that in turn 
invokes another app with still greater permissions, the final receiver could be excessively more 
privileged than the original sender. This pattern can lead to privilege escalation[27][4][28][29][7]
[30]. Multiple works have identified this problem and implemented caller chains to resolve 
it[16]. However, all these solutions are relatively complex and require modification of the 
Android operating system.
Illustration 11: Caller chain.
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Using IEM, it is easy to implement a user firewall which can track call chains. Illustration 11 
demonstrates a user firewall which a single developer programmed in under an hour. When an 
intent enters this user firewall, it records the sender and receiver as a pair. The user firewall can 
then use these pairs to recursively determine all the callers associated with a particular receiving 
app. The user firewall can then analyze the callers to determine if the permissions of the receiver 
greatly exceed those of the instigator.
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6 Evaluation
In addition to evaluating IEM in terms of what useful user firewalls it allows developers to 
create, IEM is also formally evaluated based on three additional criteria. First, how much of the 
framework has to be modified in order to implement IEM? Second, how does IEM impact the 
stability of currently existing Android apps; both when allowing and blocking intents. And third, 
how does IEM impact the time it takes to route intents? Security is also important, but this has 
already been covered in the design section.
Object Modified Added Changed
Intent Firewall 24 606 61.6%
Active Services 14 27 1.8%
Stack Supervisor 3 2 0.2%
Broadcast Queue 4 9 1.3%
AMS 0 39 0.2%
Intent 0 13 0.6%
Table 2: Lines of code modified separated by framework object.
6.1 Code Impact
Since IEM is designed in hopes of one day being integrated into the Android Open-source 
Project (AOSP) source code, one of the criteria for evaluation is the amount of code which has to
be modified in order to implement IEM. Minimizing the lines of code within IEM attests to a 
design which is efficient and maintainable while minimizing the lines of code modified outside 
of IEM attests to the side effect implementing this design has on the rest of the framework. The 
code impact is summarized in Table 2. IEM's interceptor and interface comprise one Java object 
and is compared against the original intent firewall.
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Since IEM requires additional parameters in order to remain stateless, as summarized in Table 1, 
modifying framework objects other than IEM is inevitable. However, Table 2 shows that the 
lines of code modified outside IEM are minimal. Most of these changes are to fetch objects 
which the new IEM public methods require and which are already present inside the calling 
object. The intent class did have to be extended to include an intent token field, but this change 
has no impact on already existing apps.
To test the maintainability of the code, I first implemented IEM in Android 5.0.2 and then 
migrated it to 5.1.1. I was able to do the migration in less than a day.
6.2 Application Stability
I tested IEM using the standard Google apps which come on Nexus devices as well as the top 50 
free third-party apps from the Google Play Store. I explicitly included the Google apps in the 
evaluation because I found that they communicate with each other heavily using a wide variety 
of intent types. The Google Play Service, for example, communicates with every other Google 
app for authentication so the user doesn't have to log into each app individually. The Google apps
also leverage all the intent types with a higher frequency than other third party apps. This is once 
again because the Google apps are heavily interconnected while most other popular apps tend to 
be more standalone.
During the testing of IEM, no cases where found where blocking an intent would cause an app to
crash. When blocking access to the Google Play Services, I did find apps which would refuse to 
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start, prompting the user that Play Services needs to be installed. Blocking an app's own services 
can cause timeouts during operations—like fetching new emails—but once again I did not 
encounter any crashes or freezes. I also noticed that if a service is blocked and then later allowed,
it could take up to a few minutes for the app to re-establish the service connection. Manually 
restarting the app expedited the reconnection time. Blocking broadcasts can disrupt some flows. 
For example, if broadcasts within the Play Store app are blocked, an app update will download, 
but not install.
Overall, I found apps to be stable, even when the user firewall decides to block most intents. I 
recommend that developers creating user firewalls for typical consumers place emphasis on 
informing the user when intents are being blocked, otherwise the lack of feedback could cause 
confusion.
No User Firewall Allow All Intents Call Chain
Activity 346.9 348.2 352.1
Service 14.0 14.9 16.8
Broadcast 7.6 11.8 12.2
Table 3: Milliseconds to route intents from sender to receiver, averaged over 5000 trials.
6.3 Performance
To test the intent routing performance of IEM, I created two simple apps to send and receive 
activity, service, and broadcast intents. The sender app places the current system time inside the 
intent and then the receiving app retrieves this value and calculates the difference.
Table 3 shows the milliseconds needed to send the intent across apps. Each value shown is the 
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average of 5000 trials. The test device was a Nexus 5 running the modified version of Android 
5.0.2. The tested user firewalls implement no caching between intent inspections and inspect 
every intent using the same procedure.
For the first set of trials, I configured IEM to not use a user firewall. This serves as a baseline as 
the logic in this configuration is identical to the original intent firewall. I then tested the intents 
using two user firewall policies. The allow all policy accepts any intent and serves to measure the
overhead added by the round trip between the interface and the user firewall. The call chain 
policy inspects, stores, and logs every intent's sender and receiver and then recursively constructs
chains. This is the most performance intensive example from the applications section.
The results in Table 3 show that the user firewall interface adds some overhead, but the 
difference in routing time remains well below what a human user can perceive. Granted, 
performance is mostly dependent on the efficiency of the particular user firewall app, but the 
experiment shows that IEM itself is acceptably efficient and user firewalls can achieve useful 
functionality with reasonable performance.
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7 Conclusion
Android is the most popular operating system for embedded mobile devices. It is designed to 
encourage apps to leverage IPC with a greater frequency than seen in operating systems which 
target traditional computers. This, coupled with the nature of intent communication, makes 
studying the security of Android IPC a valuable endeavor. The current Android system includes a
firewall which can perform access control on intent IPC. However, its poor usability means it has
almost never been used in practice. This work proposes IEM which separates the interceptor of 
the firewall from its decision engine and places it inside a normal application called a user 
firewall. By doing so, IEM makes it easy to develop and modify the firewall logic, allowing for 
easy implementation of interesting new access control.
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